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A large literature has documented a significant increase in the return to college over the past 
30 years. This increase is typically measured using nominal wages. I show that from 1980 to 
2000, college graduates have increasingly concentrated in metropolitan areas that are 
characterized by a high cost of housing. This implies that college graduates are increasingly 
exposed to a high cost of living and that the relative increase in their real wage may be 
smaller than the relative increase in their nominal wage. To measure the college premium in 
real terms, I deflate nominal wages using a new CPI that allows for changes in the cost of 
housing to vary across metropolitan areas and education groups. I find that half of the 
documented increase in the return to college between 1980 and 2000 disappears when I use 
real wages. This finding does not appear to be driven by differences in housing quality and is 
robust to a number of alternative specifications. The implications of this finding for changes in 
well-being inequality depend on why college graduates sort into expensive cities. Using a 
simple general equilibrium model, I consider two alternative explanations. First, it is possible 
that the relative supply of college graduates increases in expensive cities because college 
graduates are increasingly attracted by amenities located in those cities. In this case, higher 
cost of housing reflects consumption of desirable local amenities, and there may still be a 
significant increase in well-being inequality even if the increase in real wage inequality is 
limited. Alternatively, it is possible that the relative demand of college graduates increases in 
expensive cities due to shifts in the relative productivity of skilled labor. In this case, the 
relative increase in skilled workers’ standard of living is offset by higher cost of living. The 
empirical evidence indicates that relative demand shifts are more important than relative 
supply shifts, suggesting that the increase in well-being inequality between 1980 and 2000 is 
smaller than the increase in nominal wage inequality. 
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A large literature in labor economics has documented a signicant increase in wage in-
equality over the past 30 years.1 Wage inequality is often measured as the dierence between
the wage of skilled and unskilled workers, or between the wage of workers at the top and the
bottom of the wage distribution.2 The existing literature has proposed three broad classes
of explanations for the increase in inequality: an increase in the relative demand for skills
caused by skill biased technical change and product demand shifts across sectors with dier-
ent skill intensities; a slowdown in the growth of the relative supply of skilled workers; and
the erosion of labor market institutions, such as unions and the minimum wage, that protect
low-wage workers.
In this paper, I re-examine how inequality is measured and how it is interpreted. The
increase in inequality is typically measured using nominal wages. However, skilled and
unskilled workers are not distributed uniformly across cities within the US, and changes in
housing costs vary signicantly across cities. I assess how existing estimates of inequality
change when dierences in the cost of living across locations are taken into account. I focus
on changes between 1980 and 2000 in the dierence in the average hourly wage for workers
with a high school degree and workers with college or more. Using data from the Census of
Population, I show that from 1980 to 2000 college graduates have increasingly concentrated
in metropolitan areas that are characterized by a high cost of housing. Indeed, much of the
growth in the number of college graduates has occurred in metropolitan areas that both have
a high initial cost of housing and also experience large increases in the cost of housing. This
implies that college graduates are increasingly exposed to a high cost of living and that the
relative increase in their real wage may be smaller than the relative increase in their nominal
wage.
Although the cost of housing varies substantially across metropolitan areas, changes in the
cost of living are almost universally measured using the single nation-wide Consumer Price
Index (CPI) computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Changes in this ocial CPI
are a weighted average of changes in the price of the goods in a representative consumption
basket. The weights re
ect the share of income that the average consumer spends on each
good. Housing is by far the largest single item in the CPI, accounting for more than a third
of the index.
To measure the wage dierence between college graduates and high school graduates in
real terms, I de
ate nominal wages using a new CPI that allows for geographical dierences.
I closely follow the methodology that the BLS uses to build the ocial CPI, while allowing
for increases in the cost of housing to vary across metropolitan areas and skill groups. In
some specications, I also allow for the price of non-housing goods and services to vary across
1Comprehensive surveys are found in Katz and Autor (1999) and Goldin and Katz (2007).
2Wage dispersion within skill groups has also increased. In this paper I focus on inequality between
groups.
1metropolitan areas.
The results are striking. First, I nd that between 1980 and 2000, the cost of housing
for college graduates grows much faster than cost of housing for high school graduates.
Specically, in 1980 the dierence in the average cost of housing between college and high
school graduates is 19%. This dierence grows to 44% in 2000, or more than double the
1980 dierence. Second, consistent with what is documented by the previous literature, I
nd that the dierence between the nominal wage of high school and college graduates has
increased 20 percentage points between 1980 and 2000. However, the dierence between
the real wage of high school and college graduates has increased only 8 to 10 percentage
points. This implies that changes in the cost of living experienced by high school and college
graduates account for at least half of the increase in the nominal college premium over the
1980-2000 period. Third, the college premium is signicantly smaller in real terms than in
nominal terms for each year. For example, in 2000 the average dierence between the wage
of college graduates and high school graduates is 60% in nominal terms and only 37%-43% in
real terms. These ndings do not appear to be driven by dierent trends in relative housing
quality and are robust to a number of alternative specications.
Overall, the dierence in the real wage between skilled and unskilled workers is smaller
than the nominal dierence and has grown signicantly less. The implications of this nding
for well-being inequality are not straightforward and crucially depend on why college grad-
uates tend to sort into expensive metropolitan areas. I consider two possible explanations
and use a simple general equilibrium model to illustrate their dierent implications.
First, it is possible that college graduates move to expensive cities because rms in those
cities experience an increase in the relative demand for skilled workers. This increase can
be due to localized skill-biased technical change or positive shocks to the product demand
for skill intensive industries that are predominantly located in expensive cities (for example,
high tech and nance are mostly located in expensive coastal cities). If college graduates
increasingly concentrate in expensive cities such as San Francisco and New York because the
jobs for college graduates are increasingly concentrated in those cities|and not because they
particularly like living in San Francisco and New York|then the increase in their utility level
is smaller than the increase in their nominal wage. In this scenario, the increase in well-being
inequality is smaller than the increase in nominal wage inequality because of the higher costs
of living faced by college graduates.
Alternatively, it is possible that college graduates move to expensive cities because the
relative supply of skilled workers increases in those cities. This may be due, for example, to
an increase in the local amenities that attract college graduates. In this scenario, increases
in the cost of living in these cities re
ect the increased attractiveness of the cities and
represent the price to pay for the consumption of desirable amenities. This consumption
arguably generates utility. If college graduates move to expensive cities like San Francisco
and New York because they want to enjoy the local amenities|and not primarily because
of labor demand|then there may still be a signicant increase in utility inequality even if
2the increase in real wage inequality is limited. The two scenario are not mutually exclusive,
since in practice it is possible that both relative demand and supply shifts take place.
To determine whether relative demand or relative supply shocks are more important
in practice, I analyze the empirical relationship between changes in the college premium
and changes in the share of college graduates across metropolitan areas. Under the relative
demand hypothesis, one should see a positive equilibrium relationship between changes in the
college premium and changes in the college share. Intuitively, increases in the relative demand
of college graduates in a city should result in increases in their relative wage there. Under
the relative supply hypothesis, one should not see such a positive relationship. Increases in
the relative supply of college graduates in a city should cause their relative wage to decline,
or at least not to increase. Consistent with demand shocks playing an important role, I
nd a strong positive association between changes in the college premium and changes in
the college share. I also present instrumental variable estimates obtained by instrumenting
changes in the college share with a measure of arguably exogenous demand shocks. The
instrument|a weighted average of nationwide relative employment growth by industry, with
weights re
ecting the city-specic employment share in those industries|isolates the eect
of changes in the college share that are driven exclusively by changes in relative demand.
Although I can not completely rule out the existence of supply shocks, the empirical
evidence is more consistent with the notion that demand shocks are the main force driving
changes in the number of skilled workers across metropolitan areas. If this is true, it implies
that the increase in well-being inequality between 1980 and 2000 is smaller than the increase
in nominal wage inequality.
This result has the potential to explain an outstanding puzzle in the inequality literature.
Despite the increase in the return to education, the rate of growth in the number of college
graduates is still low relative to earlier periods. The fact that their real wage has not increased
as much as previously thought may explain why the number of college graduates has not
increased as much as one would have expected. More generally, the evidence in this paper
indicates that general equilibrium eects can undo some of the eects of relative demand
shifts.3
My ndings are consistent with previous studies that identify shifts in labor demand|
whether due to skill-biased technical change or product demand shifts across industries with
dierent skill intensities|as an important determinant of the increase in wage inequality
(for example, Katz and Murphy, 1992; Krueger, 1993; Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998).
But unlike the previous literature, my ndings point to an important role for the local
component of these demand shifts. While in this paper I take these local demand shifts as
exogenous, future research should investigate the economic forces that make skilled workers
more productive in some parts of the country.4 The notion that demand shocks are important
determinants of population shifts is consistent with the evidence in Blanchard and Katz
3See also Heckman et al (1998).
4See for example Moretti (2004a and 2004b) and Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2007).
3(1992) and Bound and Holzer (2000).5 The specic nding that variation in the college
share is mostly driven by demand factors is consistent with the argument made by Berry
and Glaeser (2005) and Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008). My results on dierential housing
costs complement the ndings on non-housing consumption in a contemporaneous paper by
Broda and Romalis (2008) which documents the distributional consequences of increased
imports from China. They nd that, because of international trade, poor households are
exposed to lower in
ation for non-housing goods than rich households. Taken together,
my ndings and their ndings suggest that the overall dierence in real income between
the rich and the poor is smaller than previously thought. My results are also related to
a paper by Black, Kolesnikova, and Taylor (2007) which, along with earlier work by Dahl
(2002), criticizes the standard practice of treating the returns to education as uniform across
locations. They show that, in theory, the return to schooling is constant across locations
only in the special case of homothetic preferences, and argue that the returns to education
are empirically lower in high-amenity locations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe some recent changes
in the geographical distribution of skilled and unskilled workers. In Section 3, I describe how
the ocial CPI is calculated by the BLS and I propose two alternative CPI's that allow
for geographical dierences across skill groups. In Section 4, I present the main evidence on
nominal and real inequality. In Section 5, I present a simple model that can help interpreting
the empirical evidence. In Section 6, I discuss the dierent implications of the demand pull
and supply push hypotheses and present empirical evidence to distinguish the two. Section
7 concludes.
2 The Cost of Living and Location of Skilled and Un-
skilled Workers
I begin with some descriptive evidence on recent changes in the geographical location
of skilled and unskilled workers and housing costs. Throughout the paper, I use data from
the 1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses of Population. The geographical unit of analysis is the
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) of residence. Rural households in the Census are not
assigned a MSA. In order to keep my wage regressions as representative and as consistent
with the previous literature as possible, I group workers who live outside a MSA by state,
and treat these groups as additional geographical units.
Table 1 documents dierences in the fraction of college graduates across some US metropoli-
tan areas. Specically, the top (bottom) panel reports the 10 cities with the highest (lowest)
fraction of workers with a college degree or more in 2000. Throughout the paper, college
graduates also include individuals with a post-graduate education. The metropolitan area
5Chen and Rosenthal (forthcoming) document that jobs are the key determinant of mobility of young
individuals. Mobility of older individuals seems more likely to be driven by amenities.
4with the largest share of workers with a college degree among its residents is Stamford, CT,
where 58% of workers has a college degree or more. The fraction of college graduates in
Stamford is almost 5 times the fraction of college graduates in the city at the bottom on
the distribution|Danville, VA|where only 12% of workers have a college degree. Other
metropolitan areas in the top group include MSA's with an industrial mix that is heavy in
high tech and R&D|such as San Jose, San Francisco, Boston and Raleigh-Durham|and
MSA's with large universities| such as Ann Arbor, MI and Fort Collins, CO. Metropolitan
areas in the top panel have a higher cost of housing|as measured by the average monthly
rent for a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment|than metropolitan areas in the bottom panel. College
share and the cost of housing vary substantially not only in their levels across locations but
also in their changes over time. While cities like Stamford, Boston, San Jose and San Fran-
cisco experienced large increases in both the share of workers with a college degree and the
monthly rent between 1980 and 2000, cities in the bottom panel experienced more limited
increases.
The top panel of Figure 1 shows how the 1980-2000 change in the share of college grad-
uates relates to the 1980 share of college graduates. The positive relationship indicates that
college graduates are increasingly concentrated in metropolitan areas that have a large share
of college graduates in 1980. This relationship has been documented by Moretti (2004) and
Berry and Glaeser (2005).6 The middle panel of Figure 1 shows how the 1980-2000 change
in the share of college graduates relates to the average cost of housing in 1980. The positive
relationship indicates that college graduates are increasingly concentrated in MSA's where
housing is initially expensive.7 The bottom panel plots the 1980-2000 change in college share
as a function of the 1980-2000 change in the average monthly rental price. The positive rela-
tionship suggests that the share of college graduates has increased in MSA's where housing
has become more expensive.8 These relationships do not have a causal interpretation, but
instead need to be interpreted as equilibrium relationships.
Probably a better measure of the cost of housing experienced by college graduates in a
given city is the average rent paid by college graduates in that city. Allowing for the cost of
housing faced by dierent skill groups in a given city to be dierent is potentially important,
since tastes and budget constraints might dier across skill groups. This implies that the
type of housing that is used by college graduates is not necessarily identical to the one that
is used by high school graduates. The top left panel in Figure 2 shows the 1980-2000 increase
6The regression of the 1980-2000 change in college share on the 1980 level in college share weighted by
the 1980 MSA size yields a coecient equal to .460 (.032), indicating that a 10 percentage point dierence in
the baseline college share in 1980 is associated with a 4.6 percentage point increase in college share between
1980 and 2000.
7The regression of the 1980-2000 change in college share on the 1980 cost of housing weighted by the 1980
MSA size yields a coecient equal to .0011 (.00006), indicating that a 100 dollar dierence in the baseline
monthly rent in 1980 is associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in college share between 1980 and
2000.
8The regression yields a coecient equal to .0003 (.00001).
5in the share of college graduates, by quintile of 1980 cost of housing for college graduates,
as measured by the average monthly rent paid by college graduates for a 2 or 3 bedroom
apartment in the relevant metropolitan area. Metropolitan areas where college graduates
pay high rent in 1980 experience a larger increase in college share between 1980 and 2000,
and this increase is monotonic. The top right panel shows the 1980-2000 increase in the share
of college graduates, by quintile of the 1980-2000 increase in cost of housing. Metropolitan
areas where the rent paid by college graduates increases the most between 1980 and 2000
experience a larger increase in college share between 1980 and 2000.
Even within a skill group, not all households may use the same type of housing. For
example, the housing needs of a family with many children might not be identical to those of
a couple with the same education in the same metropolitan area but no children. I consider
an alternative measure of the cost of housing that allows the cost faced by households in
a given education group and city to vary depending on family size and race. To do so, I
take the the tted value from a regression of rental cost on identiers for metropolitan area,
education group, number of children, race and interactions. This regression is estimated on
the sample of renters of 2 or 3 bedroom apartments, and the predicted values are calculated
for all households. The bottom panels of Figure 2 show the 1980-2000 increase in the share
of college graduates by quintile of predicted 1980 cost of housing (left panel) and by quintile
of predicted 1980-2000 increase in cost of housing (right panel). The pattern is similar to
the one in the top panel.
Taken together, the four panels in Figure 2 show that the metropolitan areas that have
experienced the largest increases in the share of college graduates are the metropolitan areas
where the average cost of housing for college graduates in 1980 is highest and also the areas
where the average cost of housing for college graduates has increased the most.
3 Cost of Living Indexes
In this Section, I brie
y describe how the Bureau of Labor Statistics computes the ocial
Consumer Price Index (subsection 3.1), and I propose a new measure of cost of living that
accounts for geographical dierences (subsection 3.2). In the next Section, I use this new
measure to estimate how much of the dierence in wages between skilled and unskilled
workers can be attributed to geographical dierences in the cost of living.
3.1 The Ocial Cost of Living Index
A cost of living index seeks to measure changes over time in the amount that consumers
need to spend to reach a certain utility level or \standard of living." Changes in the ocial
Consumer Price Index between period t and t + 1 as measured by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics are a weighted average of changes in the price of the goods in a representative
consumption basket. The basket is the original consumption basket at time t, and the
6weights re
ect the share of income that the average consumer spends on each good at time
t.9
Table 2 shows the relative importance of the main aggregate components of the CPI-U
in 2000. The largest component by far is housing. In 2000, housing accounts for more than
42% of the CPI-U. The largest sub-components of housing costs are \Shelter" and \Fuel
and Utilities". The second and third main components of the CPI-U are transportation and
food. They only account for 17.2% and 14.9% of the CPI-U, respectively. The weights of all
the other categories are 6% or smaller.
Although most households in the US are homeowners, changes in the price of housing
are measured by the BLS using changes in the cost of renting an apartment (Poole, Ptacek
and Verbugge, 2006; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007). The rationale for using rental costs
instead of home prices is that rental costs are a better approximation of the user cost of hous-
ing. Since houses are an asset, their price re
ects both the user cost as well as expectations
of future appreciation.
Rental costs vary signicantly across metropolitan areas. For example, in 2000, the
average rental cost for a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment in San Diego, CA|the city at the 90th
percentile of the distribution|is $894. This rental cost is almost 3 times higher than the
rental cost for an equally sized apartment in Decatour, AL, the city at the 10th percentile.
3.2 Local Consumer Price Indexes
Although the cost of living varies substantially across metropolitan areas, wage and in-
come are typically de
ated using a single, nation-wide de
ator, such as the CPI-U calculated
by the BLS. To investigate the role of cost of living dierences on wage dierences between
skill groups, I propose two CPI indexes that are skill-group specic. I closely follow the
methodology that the Bureau of Labor Statistics uses to build the ocial Consumer Price
Index, but I generalize two of its assumptions.
Local CPI 1. First, I compute a CPI that allows for the metropolitan area of residence
of skilled and unskilled workers and the type of housing used by skilled and unskilled workers
to dier. Specically, to measure the cost of housing faced by an individual in metropolitan
area c and skill group j, I take the average of the monthly cost of renting a 2 or 3 bedroom
apartment among all individuals in group j in area c. Consistent with BLS methodology, I
assign the cost of housing to homeowners based on changes in the relevant average monthly
rent. It is important to note that this methodology ensures that the de
ator that I use for
9One well known problem with the CPI is the potential for substitution bias, which is the possibility that
consumers respond to price changes by substituting relatively cheaper goods for goods that have become
more expensive. While the actual consumption baskets may change, the CPI reports in
ation for the original
basket. Details of the BLS methodology are described in Chapter 17 of the Handbook of Methods (BLS,
2007), titled \The Consumer Price Index".
7a given worker does not re
ect the increase in the cost of the apartment rented or the cost
of the house owned by that specic worker. Instead, it re
ects the increase in the cost of
housing experienced by workers in the same city and education group, irrespective of their
own individual housing cost and irrespective of whether they rent or own.
Following the BLS methodology, I then take the properly weighted sum of the cost of
housing|with the average across cities and skill groups normalized to 1 in 1980|and non-
housing consumption|normalized to 1 in 1980. The weights are the weights used by BLS
in the relevant year. The cost of non-housing consumption is assumed to be the same for
all individuals in a given year and is obtained by subtracting changes in the cost of housing
from the nationwide CPI-U computed by the BLS:
CPI Non-Housing = (CPI-U=(1   w))   (w=(1   w))Housing (1)
where \Housing" is the average nationwide increase in cost of housing (from Census data)
and w is the BLS housing weight in the relevant year.10
I call the resulting local price index \Local CPI 1". Note that Local CPI 1 varies by
MSA as well as by education group. This is because the type of housing that is relevant
for college graduates in a given MSA does not have to be identical to the type of housing
that is relevant for high school graduates in the same MSA. For a given education group, the
correct measure of housing cost in
ation for the period between t and t+1 should re
ect how
much the cost of purchasing the housing bundle consumed by that education group at time
t increases between t and t + 1. Dierences in the housing bundle (type of dwellings, type
of neighborhoods, etc.) consumed by dierent education groups are potentially important if
tastes are dierent, or if tastes are the same but preferences are non-homothetic. Whatever
the housing consumption bundle chosen by college graduates and high school graduates in
1980, my CPI seeks to measure how the price of that bundle changes between 1980 and
2000. While college graduates may in principle be able to aord buying the housing bundle
consumed by high school graduates, what matters to college graduates given their own tastes
and their own budget constraint is how the price of their own housing consumption bundle
changes over time. How the price of the housing consumption bundle of high school graduates
changes over time is not relevant to college graduates.11 Broda and Romalis (2008) make a
10In practice, my measure of rent is the \gross monthly rental cost" of the housing unit. This includes
contract rent plus additional costs for utilities (water, electricity, gas) and fuels (oil, coal, kerosene, wood,
etc.). This variable is considered by IPUMS as more comparable across households than \contract rent",
which may or may not include utilities and fuels. The Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) also uses the \gross monthly rental cost" measure of rent to calculate the federally mandated \Fair
Market Rent". The weights are the BLS weights for the relevant year for \Shelter" and \Fuel and Utilities".
Since the basket is updated periodically the weights vary over time. The weight for year 2000 is 0.381 (see
Table 2). The weight in 1980 is .355 and in 1990 is .356. Rents are imputed for top-coded observations
by multiplying the value of the top code by 1.3. Results do not change signicantly when no imputation is
performed or when I multiply the value of the top code by 1.4.
11Consider, for example, the dierence between Palo Alto and the neighboring East Palo Alto. They both
8similar point and argue that the basket of non-durable goods consumed by the poor diers
from the one consumed by the rich, so that the in
ation rate faced by the poor is not
necessarily the same as the in
ation rate faced by the rich. Of course, an important concern
is the possibility of dierential changes in the unmeasured quality of housing for college
graduates and high school graduates. To address this concern, in Section 4.2 I measure
changes in a rich set of observable housing quality variables, and show that the relative
changes are not substantial.12
It is possible that the relevant housing market for individuals in a given city may depend
not just on education, but also on other household characteristics, like number of children or
race. For example, the housing needs of a family with many children might not be identical
to those of a couple with no children with the same education in the same metropolitan
area. The former might be more interested, for example, in larger houses and neighborhoods
with better schools. To account for this possibility, in some specications I allow for the
cost of housing faced by dierent individuals to vary depending not only on metropolitan
area and skill level, but also on number of children and race. In this case, the relevant cost
of housing is obtained as the predicted value from a regression of rental cost on identiers
for metropolitan area, education group, number of children, race and interactions (see the
bottom panels in Figure 2). This regression is estimated on the sample of renters of 2 or 3
bedroom apartments and the predicted values are calculated for all households.
Local CPI 2. In CPI 1, changes in the cost of housing can vary across localities, but
changes in the cost of non-housing goods and services are assumed to be the same everywhere.
While the cost of housing is the most important component of the CPI, the price of other
goods and services is likely to vary systematically with the cost of housing. In cities where
land is more expensive, production costs are higher and therefore the cost of many goods and
services is higher. For example, a slice of pizza or a hair cut are likely to be more expensive in
New York city than in Indianapolis, since it is more expensive to operate a pizza restaurant
or a barber shop in New York city than Indianapolis.13
belong to the same MSA, but the former is one of the richest and better educated cities in Silicon Valley,
while the latter is much poorer, considerably less educated, and is characterized by very high crime rates
and a high fraction of minority residents. The housing market that is relevant for college graduates in that
area is more likely to be Palo Alto than East Palo Alto. As a consequence, the housing price dynamics in
Palo Alto are more relevant for college graduates than the ones in East Palo Alto. Indeed, during the dot
com boom of the late 1990s that attracted an enormous in
ux of skilled workers to Silicon Valley, housing
prices in Palo Alto skyrocketed, while housing prices in East Palo Alto were generally more stable.
12A limitation is that I use the same consumption shares for all individuals in a given year, irrespective
of where they live. While it is possible that the consumption shares dier across metropolitan areas, the
BLS only publishes nation-wide shares. Because college graduates are over-represented in expensive cities,
if the share of income spent on housing is higher in more expensive cities then my estimates of the fraction
of the college premium explained by the cost of living may be conservative and should be considered a lower
bound.
13The cost of leasing a store is certainly higher in New York; labor costs are also likely to be higher in
9In a second departure from the standard BLS CPI, I propose an index that allows for both
the cost of housing and the cost of non-housing consumption to vary across metropolitan
areas. Systematic, high quality, city-level data on the price of non-housing good and services
are not available for most cities over a long time period. The BLS releases a local CPI for
some metropolitan areas. This local CPI is far from ideal. First, it is available only for a
limited number of MSA's. Of the 315 MSA's in the 2000 Census, the metropolitan-level CPI
is made available by the BLS only for 23 MSA's in the period under consideration. Second,
it is normalized to 1 in a given year, thus precluding cross-sectional comparisons.
However, it can still be used to impute the part of local non-housing prices that varies
systematically with housing costs. The local CPI computed by the BLS for city c in year t
is a weighted average of housing cost (HPct) and non-housing costs (NHPct):
BLSct = wHPct + (1   w)NHPct (2)
where w is the CPI weight used by BLS for housing. Non-housing costs can be divided in
two components:
NHPct = HPct + vct (3)
where HPct is the component of non-housing costs that varies systematically with housing
costs; and vct is the component that is orthogonal to housing costs. If  > 0 it means that
cities with higher cost of housing also have higher costs of non-housing goods and services. I
use the small sample of MSA's for which a local BLS CPI is available to estimate .14 I then
impute the systematic component of non-housing costs to all MSA's, based on their housing
cost: E(NHPctjHPct) = ^ HPct. Finally, I compute \Local CPI 2" as a properly weighted
sum of the cost of housing, the component of non-housing costs that varies with housing
(^ HPct), and the component of non-housing costs that does not vary with housing. I use as
weights the weights used by BLS in the relevant year.15
While Local CPI 2 is more comprehensive than Local CPI 1 because it includes local
variation in both housing and non-housing costs, it is also arguably less reliable because non-
housing costs are imputed. For this reason, in the next Section I present separate estimates
New York, since workers need higher wages to live in New York.
14To do so, I rst regress changes in the BLS local index on changes in housing costs: BLSct = HPct+
ect. Estimating this regression in dierences is necessary because BLSct is normalized to 1 in a given year.
While cross-sectional comparisons based on BLSct are meaningless, BLSct does measure changes in prices
within a city. Once I have an estimate of , I can calculate ^  =
^  w
1 w. Empirically, ^  is equal to .588 (.001)
and ^  is equal to .35 in 2000.
15A limitation of this methodology is that while I allow for within-metropolitan area dierences in the
type of housing consumed by workers belonging to dierent skill groups, I need to assign the same price of
non-housing consumption to all groups. In reality, it is possible that dierent skill groups consume dierent
types of non-housing goods. Indeed, Broda and Romalis (2008) document that the in
ation rate for non-
housing goods faced by the rich is on average higher than the in
ation rate for non-housing goods faced by
the poor. If the price of non-housing goods consumed by college graduates grows faster than the price of
non-housing goods consumed by high school graduates, my measure of the dierence in the cost of living
increases between college and high school graduates is conservative.
10for Local CPI 1 and Local CPI 2. Moreover, in Section 4, I show how my estimates change
when I compute Local CPI 2 using data on non-housing prices taken from the Accra dataset
collected by the Council for Community and Economic Research.
4 Empirical Evidence
In this section I estimate how much of the dierence in wages between skilled and unskilled
workers can be attributed to geographical dierences in the cost of living. I begin in sub-
section 4.1 by documenting empirical dierences in the cost of living. The main empirical
results of the paper are in sub-section 4.2, where I show estimates of the college premium
in nominal and real terms, by year. I also discuss to what extent dierences in the cost of
housing may re
ect dierences in the quality of housing, and I investigate the robustness of
my ndings.
4.1 Dierences in the Cost of Living
Table 3 compares changes in the ocial, nation-wide CPI from the BLS to changes in my
two local CPI's. Specically, the top of the table reports changes in the ocial CPI-U, as
reported by the BLS, and normalized to 1 in 1980. This is the most widely used measure of
in
ation, and it is the measure that is almost universally used to de
ate wages and incomes.
According to this index, the price level doubled between 1980 and 2000. This increase is|by
construction|the same for college graduates and high school graduates.
The next panel shows the increase in the cost of housing faced by college graduates and
high school graduates. College graduates and high school graduates are exposed to very
dierent increases in the cost of housing. In 1980 the cost of housing for the average college
graduate is 19% more than the cost of housing for the average high school graduate. This
gap grows to 36% in 1990 and reaches 44% by 2000. Column 4 indicates that housing costs
for high school and college graduates increased between 1980 and 2000 by 113% and 156%,
respectively.
The next panel shows \Local CPI 1", normalized to 1 in 1980 for the average household.
The panel shows that in 1980 the overall cost of living experienced by college graduates
is 7% higher than the cost of living experienced by high school graduates. This dierence
increases to 18% by year 2000. The dierence in Local CPI 1 between high school and
college graduates is less pronounced than the dierence in monthly rent because Local CPI
1 includes non-housing costs as well as housing costs.
The dierential increase in cost of living faced by college graduates relative to high school
graduates is more pronounced when the price of non-housing goods and services is allowed to
vary across locations, as in the bottom panel. In the case of Local CPI 2, the cost of living is
11% higher for college graduates relative to high school graduates in 1980 and 27% in 2000.
Column 4 indicates that the increase in the overall price level experienced by high school
11graduates between 1980 and 2000 is 98%. The increase in the overall price level experienced
by college graduates between 1980 and 2000 is 127%.
4.2 Nominal and Real Wage Dierences
In this subsection I measure how much of the increase in nominal wage dierences between
college graduates and high school graduates is accounted for by dierences in the cost of
living.
Main Estimates. Model 1 in the top panel of Table 4 estimates the conditional nominal
wage dierence between workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more,
by year. Estimates in columns 1 to 4 are from a regression of the log nominal hourly
wage on an indicator for college interacted with an indicator for year 1980, an indicator for
college interacted with an indicator for year 1990, an indicator for college interacted with
an indicator for year 2000, years dummies, a cubic in potential experience, and dummies for
gender and race. Estimates in columns 5 to 8 are from models that also include MSA xed
eects. Entries are the coecients on the interactions of college and year and represent the
conditional wage dierence for the relevant year. The sample includes all US born wage and
salary workers aged 25-60 who have worked at least 48 weeks in the previous year.
My estimates in columns 1 to 4 indicate that the conditional nominal wage dierence
between workers with a high school degree and workers with college or more has increased
signicantly. The dierence is 40% in 1980 and rises to 60% by 2000. Column 4 indicates
that this increase amounts to 20 percentage points. This estimate is generally consistent
with the previous literature (see, for example, Table 3 in Katz and Autor, 1999).
Models 2 and 3 in Table 4 show the conditional real wage dierences between workers
with a high school degree and workers with college or more. To quantify this dierence, I
estimate models that are similar to Model 1, where the dependent variable is the nominal
wage divided by Local CPI 1 (in Model 2) or by Local CPI 2 (in Model 3). Two features are
noteworthy. First, the level of the conditional college premium is signicantly lower in real
terms than in nominal terms in each year. For example, in 2000 the conditional dierence
between the wage for college graduates and high school graduates is .60 in nominal terms and
only .43 in real terms when Local CPI 1 is used as de
ator. The dierence is even smaller|
.37 percentage points|when Local CPI 2 is used as de
ator. Second, the increase between
1980 and 2000 in college premium is signicantly smaller in real terms than in nominal
terms. For example, using Local CPI 1, the 1980-2000 increase in the conditional real wage
dierence between college graduates and high school graduates is 10 percentage points, or
half of the increase in the nominal wage dierence. In other words, cost of living dierences
as measured by Local CPI 1 account for 50% of the increase in conditional inequality between
college and high school graduates between 1980 and 2000 (column 4).
The eect of cost of living dierences is even more pronounced when the cost of living is
12measured by Local CPI 2. In this case, the increase in the conditional real wage dierence
between college graduates and high school graduates is 8 percentage points. This implies
that cost of living dierences as measured by Local CPI 2 account for 60% of the increase
in conditional wage inequality between college and high school graduates between 1980 and
2000 (column 4). The eect of using real wages instead of nominal wages as a dependent
variable in the regression is shown graphically in Figure 3.16
When I control for xed eects for metropolitan areas in columns 5-8, the nominal college
premium is smaller in all years, but the eect of using real wages is similar. In particular, the
increase in the college premium is 18 percentage points when measured in nominal terms,
and only 8-10 percentage points when measured in real terms, depending on whether CPI 1
or CPI 2 is used as de
ator. Put dierently, after conditioning on MSA xed eects, cost of
living dierences account for 44% to 55% of the increase in conditional inequality between
college and high school graduates between 1980 and 2000 (column 8).
Housing Quality. An important concern is the possibility that the dierential changes
in housing costs faced by skilled and unskilled workers re
ect not just changes in cost of
living, but also changes in the quality of housing. It is in principle possible that part of
the relative increase in the measured cost of housing for college graduates re
ects better
unobserved quality. This could occur if housing quality is a normal good and features of the
apartments inhabited by college graduates|such as the number of bathrooms, the quality of
the kitchen, the availability of a replace or a garage, etc.|improve more than the features of
the apartments inhabited by high school graduates. In this case, the relative increase in the
cost of housing of college graduates documented above may be overestimated. Additionally,
the size of the apartment may have changed dierently for high school and college graduates.
Although my measure of housing cost is the average rent for apartments with a xed number
of bedrooms, exact square footage may vary. For example, a 2 bedroom apartment in New
York or San Francisco is likely to be smaller than a 2 bedroom apartment in Houston or
Indianapolis. To the extent that the share of college graduates has increased more in more
expensive cities, the true per-square-foot price faced by college graduates may be higher than
the one that I measure. In this case, the relative increase in the cost of housing of college
graduates documented above may be underestimated.
While I can not completely rule out the possibility of unmeasured quality dierences,
16One might be concerned about worker selection. Models in Table 4 control for standard demographics,
but not for worker ability. Ability of college graduates and high school graduates may vary across metropoli-
tan areas. For example, a corporate lawyer in New York may have more unobserved ability than a lawyer in
Indianapolis. Similarly, a software engineer in San Jose may be of better quality than one in Grand Rapids.
Without knowing the exact type of selection, one can only speculate on the type of bias that may be caused
by the failure to account for unobserved heterogeneity. If the average unobserved ability of college graduates
relative to high school graduates is higher in expensive cities, then the estimates of the real college premia in
Table 4 are biased upward. The quality-adjusted college premia would be even smaller than the one reported
in the Table.
13here I present evidence on some quality variables that I can measure. I use data from the
American Housing Survey, which includes much richer information on housing quality than
the Census of Population. Available quality variables include square footage, number of
rooms, number of bathrooms, indicators for the presence of a garage, a usable replace, a
washer, a dryer, a dishwasher, outside water leaks, inside water leaks, open cracks in walls,
open cracks in ceilings, broken windows, presence of rodents, and a broken toilet in the last
3 months.17
I begin by reproducing the baseline estimates that do not control for quality. Estimates
based on the American Housing Survey in the top panel of Table 5 are qualitatively similar to
the corresponding baseline estimates based on the Census reported in Table 4, although the
eect of controlling for cost of living is smaller than in Table 4. I then re-estimate my models
holding constant all available measures of housing quality. As before, I measure housing cost
using the rental price for renters. But, unlike before, I rst regress housing costs on the
vector of observable housing characteristics. The residual from this regression represents the
component of the cost of housing that is orthogonal to my measures of dwelling quality. The
bottom panel of Table 5 shows how the baseline estimates change when I use the properly
renormalized residual as a measure of housing cost in my local CPI 1 and CPI 2. Entries
suggest that the 1980-2000 increase in real college premium estimated controlling for quality
is smaller than the corresponding increase in the real college premium estimated without
controlling for quality. Specically, column 4 indicates that the increase in real college
premium estimated controlling for quality is only 9 or 6 percentage points, depending on
whether Local CPI 1 or CPI 2 is used. The corresponding estimates that do not control for
quality are 14 and 13.
In sum, though I can not completely rule out the possibility of unmeasured quality
dierences, Table 5 indicates that controlling for a rich vector of observable quality dierences
result in dierences between nominal and real college premium that are even larger than the
baseline dierences.
Robustness. I now investigate the robustness of my ndings. First, I relax the as-
sumption made in Table 4 that all individuals within a given skill group and city experience
similar changes in the cost of living. In Model 1 of Table 6 I allow for the cost of housing
faced by dierent individuals to vary depending not just on skill level and metropolitan area
of residence, but also on some household characteristics, including race and number of chil-
dren. It is plausible that the type of housing and the type of neighborhoods that are relevant
for, say, a college graduate in a given city may dier depending on her family structure and
race. For the sample of renters in 2 or 3 bedrooms apartments, I run a regression where
the dependent variable is the monthly rent and the independent variables include dummies
17Each year, the American Housing Survey has a sample size that is signicantly smaller than the sample
size in the Census. To increase precision, instead of taking only 1980, 1990 and 2000, I group years 1978-1982,
1988-1992 and 1998-2002 together.
14for MSA, skill group, year, race, and number of children and interactions. I then assign
the predicted values to all individuals, irrespective of their own individual housing cost and
irrespective of whether they rent or own.
In Model 2 of Table 6, I compute Local CPI 2 using data on non-housing prices from the
Accra dataset collected by the Council for Community and Economic Research.18 The Accra
data have both advantages and disadvantages when compared to the BLS local price index.
On one hand, the Accra data are available for a much larger set of cities. Furthermore, the
detail is such that price information is available at the level of specic consumption goods
and the price is not normalized to a base year. On the other hand, the Accra data are
available only for a very limited number of goods.19 Moreover, the sample size for each good
and city is quite small and the set of cities covered changes over time. With these limitations
in mind, I follow the same methodology used to compute Local CPI 2, but use Accra data
instead of the local BLS for non-housing goods.
In Model 3, I consider the possibility that commuting distance may vary dierentially for
high school and college graduates. For example, it is possible that increases in the number
of college graduates in some cities lead high school graduates to live farther away from job
locations. To account for possible dierential changes in commuting times, I re-estimate the
baseline model where the dependent variable is wage per hour worked or spent commuting.
(I calculate hourly wage by summing number of hours worked and time spent commuting.)
In Model 4, I show estimates that include workers born outside the US. In Model 5 I drop
rural workers (i.e. those who are not assigned an MSA).
In general, estimates in Table 6 are not very dierent from the baseline estimates in Table
4. Indeed, estimates in Model 2 actually indicate an increase in real wage inequality of only
5 percentage points, which is smaller than the corresponding increase in Table 4.20
18The data were generously provided by Emek Basker. Basker (2005) and Basker and Noel (2007) describe
the Accra dataset in detail.
19Only 48 goods have prices that are consistently dened for the entire period under consideration. The
BLS basket includes more than 1000 goods.
20I have estimated several additional robustness checks that are not reported in the Table due to space
limitations. When I include all US born workers|irrespective of the number of weeks worked in the previous
year|I nd that the nominal wage dierence grows 19 percentage points, from 43% in 1980 to 62% in 2000.
The real wage dierence grows only 9 or 6 percentage points, depending on whether CPI 1 or CPI 2 is used.
When I allow for the eect of experience, race, and gender to vary over time by controlling for the interaction
of year with gender, race and a cubic in experience, results are similar to Table 4. When I estimate separate
models for male and females, results are generally similar. For example, the 1980-2000 increase in wage gap
(column 4) for males is .22 percentage points in nominal terms, .12 in real terms using local CPI 1 and .09
using local CPI 2. The corresponding gures for females are .20, .11, .09. When I estimate separate models
for workers with less than 20 years of experience and workers with more than 20 years of experience, I nd
that the college premium seems to be smaller, and to have grown less|both in nominal and real terms|for
workers with higher levels of potential experience. For example, the 1980-2000 increase in wage gap (column
4) for workers with less than 20 years of experience are .20 in nominal terms, .14 using local CPI 1 and
.11 using local CPI 2. The corresponding gures for workers with more than 20 years of experience are
.15, .06 and .05. Estimates where the dependent variable is the log of weekly or yearly earnings are also
155 A Simple Framework
In the previous Section, I have shown that over the 1980-2000 period, real wage inequality
has grown less than nominal wage inequality. Does this nding mean that the signicant
increases in wage disparities that have been documented over the last 25 years have failed
to translate into signicant increases in disparities in well-being?
Not necessarily. Changes in real wages do not necessarily equal changes in well-being.
In this Section, I use a simple general equilibrium model to investigate the implications of
my empirical ndings for changes in well-being disparities. The implications are dierent
depending on the reasons for the increase in the share of college graduates in expensive
cities. I consider two broad class of explanations for such an increase. Under a supply push
hypothesis, the relative supply of college graduates increases in expensive cities because
college graduates are increasingly attracted by amenities located in those cities. In this case,
a higher cost of housing re
ects consumption of local amenities. Since this consumption
arguably generates utility, the increase in utility disparity is larger than the increase in real
wage disparity. Under a demand pull hypothesis, the relative demand of college graduates
increases in expensive cities because their relative productivity increases there so that rms
located in these cities increasingly seek to hire skilled labor. This can be due to localized
skill-biased technical change or positive shocks to the demand faced by industries that employ
college graduates and are located in expensive cities (for example, high tech, nance, etc.).
In this case, a higher cost of housing does not re
ect better amenities, and the increase in
utility inequality is smaller than the increase in nominal wage inequality.
To formalize these two alternative hypotheses, I consider the simplest possible general
equilibrium model of the labor and housing market. The model is a generalization of the
Roback (1982) model and has two types of workers, skilled and unskilled. Like in Roback,
in equilibrium workers and rms are indierent between cities. But unlike Roback, housing
supply is not necessarily xed, so that productivity and amenity shocks are not necessarily
fully capitalized into land prices. This allows shocks to the relative demand and relative
supply of skilled workers to have dierent eects on the utility of skilled and unskilled
workers.
5.1 Assumptions and Equilibrium
Assume that there are two cities: Detroit (city a) and San Francisco (city b). Each
city is a competitive economy that produces a single output good y which is traded on the
international market, so that its price is the same everywhere and set equal to 1. There are
two type of workers: skilled workers (type H) and unskilled workers (type L).
generally consistent with Table 4. For example, the 1980-2000 increase in wage gap for weekly earnings is
.23 in nominal terms, .13 in real terms using local CPI 1 and .09 using local CPI 2. Finally, my estimates
are not very sensitive to the exclusion of outliers (dened as the top 1% and the bottom 1% of each year's
wage distribution).
16I assume that workers and rms are perfectly mobile. This implies that in equilibrium
workers need to be indierent between living in Detroit and San Francisco. Similarly, rm
prots need to be equalized across locations. Since in my empirical analysis I focus on long
run changes (over a 20 year period), this assumption does not appear to be unrealistic. For
simplicity, I also assume no human capital externalities and that the owners of land and
capital live abroad.
I rst focus on the case where skilled and unskilled workers in the same city work in
dierent rms and live in dierent neighborhoods. This amounts to assuming away imper-
fect substitution between skilled and unskilled workers and the eect that shocks to skilled
workers have on unskilled workers. This assumption greatly simplies the analysis. Later, I
show that results generalize when I relax this assumption. The production function for rms
in city c that hire skilled workers is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale:
lnyHc = XHc + hNHc + (1   h)KHc (4)
where NHc is the log of the number of skilled workers hired in city c; c = a;b; KHc is the log
of capital and XHc is a productivity shifter. If rms are price takers and labor is paid its
marginal product, the log of the wage of skilled workers, wHc, is
wHc = XHc   (1   h)NHc + (1   h)KHc + lnh (5)
Equation 5 represents the labor demand for skilled labor in city c. I assume that there is an
international capital market, so that capital is innitely supplied at price i. In equilibrium
demand for capital is equal to its supply:
XHc   hKHc + hNHc + ln(1   h) = lni (6)
To keep things simple, I do not consider worker labor supply decisions and I assume that
each worker provides one unit of labor. Similarly, I assume that each worker consumes one
unit of housing. The indirect utility of skilled workers in city c is
UHc = wHc   rHc + AHc (7)
where rHc is the cost of housing in city c in the neighborhoods where skilled workers live,
and AHc is a local amenity.
In equilibrium it has to be the case that workers have the same level of utility in San
Francisco and Detroit. This implies that skilled labor in San Francisco is supplied with
innite elasticity at the wage level
wHb = wHa + (rHb   rHa)   (AHb   AHa) (8)
and that the (inverse of) the demand curve for housing in San Francisco is
rHb = (wHb   wHa) + rHa + (AHb   AHa) (9)
17An increase in the cost of housing in San Francisco or in the wage in Detroit lowers the
supply of skilled workers in San Francisco. An increase in the cost of housing in Detroit or
an increase in the amenity in San Francisco increases the supply of workers there.
I assume that the supply of housing is
rHc = z + kcNHc (10)
The slope parameter, kc, represents how elastic the supply of housing is in city c. I assume
that this parameter is exogenously determined by geography and local land regulations. In
cities where geography and regulations make it is easy to build new housing, kc is small. In
the extreme case where there are no constraints to building new houses, the supply curve is
horizontal, and kc is zero. In cities where geography and regulations make it dicult to build
new housing, kc is large. In the extreme case where it is impossible to build new houses, the
supply curve is vertical, and kc is innite.21 Finally, I assume that the number of workers in
the economy is xed.
In period 1, the two cities are identical. Equilibrium in the labor market for skilled
workers is obtained by equating equation 5 and 8. Equilibrium in the housing market for
skilled workers is obtained by equating equation 9 and 10. Because of the assumptions on
the technology, prots are always zero, so that rms are indierent between cities. The labor
and housing markets for unskilled workers are similar. For example, the city-level production





I consider two scenarios. In the rst scenario, the productivity of skilled workers increases
relative to the productivity of unskilled workers in San Francisco. Nothing happens to
the productivity of unskilled workers in San Francisco and the productivity of skilled and
unskilled workers in Detroit. In other words, the relative demand for skilled labor increases
in San Francisco. The amenities in the two cities are identical and xed.
Formally, I assume that in period 2, the productivity shifter for skilled workers in San
Francisco is higher than in period 1: XHb2 = XHb1 + , where  > 0 represents a positive,
localized, skill-biased productivity shock. I have added subscripts 1 and 2 to denote periods
1 and 2. The dot-com boom experienced by the San Francisco Bay Area is arguably an
example of such a localized skill biased shock. Driven by the advent of the Internet and
the agglomeration of high tech rms in the area, the demand for skilled workers increased
signicantly (relative to the demand for unskilled workers) in San Francisco and San Jose in
the second half of the 1990s.
How the Equilibrium Changes. Attracted by higher labor demand, skilled workers
21Equation 10 ignores the durability of housing{i.e. the fact that once built, housing does not depreciate
quickly (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2001).
18move to San Francisco. The number of skilled workers in San Francisco increases by




The number of skilled workers in Detroit declines by the same amount. What happens to
wages and rents? In San Francisco, the nominal wage of skilled workers increases by an
amount  equal to the productivity increase
wHb2   wHb1 =  (12)
while rents increase by a fraction of :




In Detroit, nominal wages for skilled workers do not change.22 Because of the decline in the
number of workers, the cost of housing in Detroit declines:




In equilibrium workers are indierent between cities. Real wages and utility of skilled workers
increase by the same amount in San Francisco and Detroit:




Firms are also indierent between cities. Because of the assumptions on technology, rms
have zero prots in both cities. While skilled labor is now more expensive in San Francisco,
it is also more productive there. Because rms produce a good that is internationally traded,
if skilled workers weren't more productive, employers would leave San Francisco and relocate
to Detroit.
Who Benets? In this model, the benet of the increase in workers' productivity, ,
is split between workers and landowners. The fraction of  that goes to workers depends on
the relative elasticity of housing supply in the two cities. To see this, note that the change
in real wages in equation 15 depends on ka and kb, which are the elasticities of supply of
housing in Detroit and San Francisco. Two special cases are of interest.
1. In the extreme case where the supply of housing in San Francisco is perfectly inelastic
(kb = 1), all the benet of the productivity increase goes to landowners in San Fran-
cisco. Workers' utility does not change. This case is the one described in Roback (1982).
22This may look surprising at rst. Given that the supply of skilled workers has declined, and that the
demand curve is downward sloping, one might expect an increase in wages of those workers who stay in
Detroit. Indeed, this would be true in a model without capital. But in a model that includes capital, the
amount of capital increases in San Francisco (KHb2 KHb1 = 
ka+kb) and decreases in Detroit (KHa2 KHa1 =
  
ka+kb). This capital 
ow o-sets the decline in labor supply in Detroit, so that there is no change in the
wage in Detroit.
19Housing costs and nominal wages in San Francisco increase by the same amount .
Because the supply of housing is xed, the number of skilled workers in San Francisco
can not change. Since there is no migration from Detroit to San Francisco, nothing
happens to labor or housing prices in Detroit. (Another special case where all the rent
resulting from the productivity shock accrues to landowners in San Francisco is when
the elasticity of supply of housing in Detroit is innite so that ka = 0.)
2. At the other extreme is the case where the elasticity of supply of housing in San
Francisco is innite (kb = 0). In this case, all the benet of the productivity increase
goes to workers. Real wages in San Francisco and Detroit grow by . Landowners in
San Francisco are indierent, while landowners in Detroit experience a loss equal to
 due to the decline in demand for housing. (Another special case where all the rent
resulting from the productivity shock accrues to workers is when the housing supply
in Detroit is perfectly inelastic so that ka = 1.)
Distribution of the Shocks. Consistent with the empirical evidence in Section 4,
in the demand pull scenario the nominal wage averaged across the two cities increases for
skilled workers.23 Furthermore, this increase is larger than the increase in the real wage
averaged across the two cities for skilled workers, unless in period 1 skilled workers in San
Francisco have much lower productivity than skilled workers Detroit.24 In other words,
for localized skill biased demand shocks to be consistent with my empirical evidence in
Section 4, these shocks can not be concentrated in cities with a small initial share of college
graduates. Consistent with this notion, Figure 1 has shown that increases in the number of
college graduates are more concentrated among cities that have a large initial share of college
graduates. Also consistent with this notion, Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008) argue that
over the past 30 years, technological change resulted in increases in the productivity of skilled
workers in cities that already had many skilled workers. These cities also happen to be cities
with a higher than average initial share of college graduates and cost of housing. Similarly,
Berry and Glaeser (2005) show evidence consistent with a model of urban agglomeration
where the number of entrepreneurs is a function of the number of skilled people working
in an area. If skilled people are more likely to innovate in ways that employ other skilled
people, this creates an agglomeration economy where skilled people want to be around each
other.
Before proceeding, it is important to highlight that the model in this Section focuses
on the case where the housing market for skilled workers is separated from the housing
market for unskilled workers in the same city. This assumption has the advantage of making
the model very simple and transparent. It has the disadvantage that skilled and unskilled
workers in a city do not compete for the same set of houses, and therefore shocks to the
23This increase is equal to
(2XHb+hNka 2XHa+h)
h(kb+ka)N .
24Formally, XHa < XHb + (h)=2.
20relative demand or supply of skilled workers have no eect on unskilled workers in the city.
I also assume that the labor supply in each city is innitely elastic. In Appendix 1, I show
that the the qualitative results of the model hold when the housing market is integrated|i.e.
skilled and unskilled workers in a city compete for the same set of houses|and the labor
supply in a city is not innitely elastic but is upward sloping.25
5.3 Supply Push
In the case of demand pull described above, the number of skilled workers in San Francisco
increases because the relative demand of skilled workers increases. I now turn to the opposite
case, where the number of skilled workers in San Francisco increases because the relative
supply of skilled workers in San Francisco increases. Specically, I consider what happens
when San Francisco becomes more desirable for skilled workers relative to Detroit. I assume
that in period 2, the amenity level increases in San Francisco: AHb2 = AHb1 + 0, where
0 > 0 now represents the improvement in the amenity. I assume that the productivity of
both skilled and unskilled workers, as well as the amenity level in Detroit, do not change.26
How the Equilibrium Changes Like for the case of demand pull above, 0
ka+kb skilled
workers move from Detroit to San Francisco. As before, the cost of housing increases in San
Francisco (by the amount in equation 13) and declines in Detroit (by the amount in equation
14). Also, similar to before, the nominal wage in Detroit does not change.
A key dierence with the case of demand pull is that the nominal wage of skilled workers
in San Francisco remains unchanged. This may be surprising at rst. While one expects
wage increases in response to demand increases (this is exactly what happens in subsection
5.2), one expects wage decreases in response to supply increases. Why nominal wages do
not decline in San Francisco after it has become more attractive? After all, skilled workers
should be willing to pay a compensating dierential in the form of lower nominal wages to
live in the more desirable city. Indeed, this is what the Roback (1982) model would predict.
But the Roback model ignores the endogenous reaction of capital. In a model with capital,
nominal wages do not move in San Francisco because capital 
ows to San Francisco and
leaves Detroit, osetting the changes in labor supply in the two cities.27 Workers in both
25Another assumption of the model is that skilled and unskilled workers are employed by dierent rms.
The model generalizes to the case where skilled and unskilled worker can work in the same rm. In this
case, the productivity of unskilled workers may increase when the number of skilled workers in the same rm
increases because of complementarities between skilled and unskilled labor.
26For simplicity, I have assumed that supply shocks are driven by increases in amenities for given tastes.
Glaeser and Tobio (2007) have a model that makes a similar assumption. Alternatively I could assume that
(i) amenities are xed, but the taste for those amenities increase; or (ii) both amenities and tastes are xed,
but amenities are a normal good so that college graduates consume more of them than high school graduates
(Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai, 2006).
27The amount of capital increases in San Francisco by KHb2   KHb1 = 
0
ka+kb and decreases in Detroit by
21cities experience an increase in utility equal to ka
ka+kb0. The two special cases described in
subsection 5.2 apply to this scenario as well. As mentioned above, in Appendix 1, I discuss
a more general model where the housing market is integrated, and labor supply in a city is
not innitely elastic. The results are similar.
Distribution of the Shocks. In this scenario, the mean nominal wage across the two
cities increases for skilled workers only if improvements in amenities are concentrated in
cities with high initial wages for skilled workers. The intuition is simple. Under the supply
push hypothesis, the nominal wage of skilled workers in San Francisco and Detroit does
not change. However, if San Francisco has higher nominal wages to begin with, the shift of
skilled workers from Detroit to San Francisco results in higher mean nominal wage across the
two cities for skilled workers. In other words, for the supply push scenario to be consistent
with the nationwide increase in nominal wage inequality documented in Section 4, cities that
experience increases in the relative supply of college graduates in the 1980-2000 period need
to be cities with high initial nominal wages in 1980.
6 Interpreting the Evidence: Demand Pull or Supply
Push?
6.1 Dierent Implications for Inequality
The analysis in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 suggests that for a given nation-wide increase in
the nominal wage gap, the demand pull hypothesis implies a more limited increase in utility
inequality, while the supply push hypothesis implies a larger increase in utility inequality.28
The intuition is simple. If college graduates move to expensive cities like San Francisco and
New York because of increases in the relative demand for college graduates in these cities|
and not because they particularly like living in San Francisco and New York|then part of
the increase in nominal wage is oset by the higher cost of living. In this case, the increase
in their utility level is smaller than the increase in their nominal wage.
On the other hand, if college graduates move to expensive cities like San Francisco and
New York because improvements in amenities raise the relative supply of college graduates
there|and not because of labor demand|then there may still be a signicant increase in
utility inequality even if the increase in real wage inequality is limited. In this case, increases
in the cost of living in these cities simply re
ect the increased attractiveness of these cities
to skilled workers and represent the price to pay for the consumption of desirable amenities.
KHa2   KHa1 =   
0
ka+kb.
28The ratio of the increase in worker's utility over the increase in mean nominal wage across the two cities
is Nkah
2(XHb XHa)+h(Nka+) for the demand pull case and Nkah
XHb XHa for the supply push case. It is clear that
the latter is larger than the former.
22The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive since it is possible that cities experience
both demand and supply shocks. Moreover, it is even possible that relative demand shifts
endogenously generate relative supply shifts, and viceversa. For example, it is possible that
an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor in a city results in an increase in the
number of college educated residents in that city and this in turns results in increases in the
local amenities that are attractive to college graduates, such as good schools, good theaters,
good restaurants, etc. Alternatively, it is possible that an increase in the supply of skilled
workers in a city generates agglomeration spillovers that lead to increases in the productivity
of rms and workers in that city (Moretti 2004a, 2004b). Ultimately, what matters for the
interpretation of my ndings is whether the combined relative demand shocks are empirically
more or less important in driving changes in college share across metropolitan areas than
the combined relative supply shocks.
It is important to point out that, while the focus of the paper is on wage inequality, the
broader welfare consequences of the demand and supply shocks depend not just on changes
in relative wages, but also on which of the two education groups originally owns the land in
the cities that benet from the demand and supply shocks. In the model, some landowners
benet from the demand and supply shocks (namely those in San Francisco), while other are
hurt (namely those in Detroit). The relevant empirical question in this respect is which of the
two skill groups owns the land in the marginal neighborhood that is gentried by the in
ow
of college graduates in cities that experience positive shocks and the marginal neighborhood
that is abandoned by the out
ow of college graduates from cities that experience negative
shocks. A full empirical treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and is left
for future research.
6.2 Demand or Supply?
I now present empirical evidence that seeks to determine which of the two forces|demand
or supply|dominates in practice. The analysis in subsections 5.2 and 5.3 suggests that
the demand pull and the supply push hypotheses have similar predictions for housing costs:
under both hypotheses, cities that experience large increases in the share of college graduates
should also experience large increases in housing costs. But the demand pull and supply push
hypotheses have dierent predictions for wage changes. Under the demand pull hypothesis,
cities that experience large increases in the share of college graduates should experience
large increases in the relative nominal wage of college graduates. Under the supply push
hypothesis, there should be no relationship between increases in the share of college graduates
and changes in the relative nominal wages. Intuitively, increases in the relative demand of a
factor of production in a city should result in increases in its relative price there. Increases in
the relative supply of factor of production in a city should cause its relative price to decline,
or at least not to increase. (See subsections 5.2 and 5.3 for details.)
I present two pieces of empirical evidence.
23(1) First, in Figure 4, I show the empirical relationship between the college share and
the college premium across US metropolitan areas, both in the 2000 cross-section and in
changes between 1980 and 2000. Demand pull would predict a positive slope, while supply
push would predict zero slope. The Figure shows a positive association between the college
share and the college premium across US metropolitan areas, both in levels as well as in
changes. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 7 quantify the corresponding regression coecients. The
dependent variable is the city-specic college premium, dened as the city-specic dierence
in the log of hourly wage for college graduates and high school graduates conditional on all
the controls used in the regressions (a cubic in potential experience, year eects, gender and
race). Models are weighted by city size. The coecient for the specication in column 2 is
positive and statistically signicant: .388 (.057).
This evidence is consistent with demand factors playing a signicant role in driving
variation in college share across cities. This conclusion is consistent with Berry and Glaeser
(2005), who argue that demand factors play a more important role than supply factors in
explaining the sorting of skilled workers across US metropolitan areas. While Figure 4 and
Table 7 indicate that demand factors are important, they can not rule out that supply shocks
are also present.
It is important to point out that the relationship between college premium and college
share is not causal. Rather, it is an equilibrium relationship. This is in contrast with earlier
work, including my own, that seeks to establish the causal eect of increases in college share
on wages and therefore estimate dierent specications.29 What I am measuring in Figure 4
and Table 7 is the relationship between the wage gap and the college share, inclusive of any
human capital spillover.
(2) As a second piece of evidence that may shed more light on the importance of demand
factors in driving variation in college share across cities, I use observable shocks to the relative
demand of skilled labor as an instrumental variable for college share.
This IV estimate isolates the eect on the college premium of changes in the college share
that are driven exclusively by changes in relative demand. Put dierently, the instrumental
variable estimate establishes what happens to the college premium in a city when the city
experiences an increase in the number of college graduates that is driven purely by an increase
in the relative demand for college graduates. By contrast, the OLS estimate above establishes
what happens to the college premium in a city when the city experiences an increase in
29For example, in Moretti (2004), I try to establish the causal eect of increases in college share on wages.
The econometric specication adopted here diers from the specication there, because in Moretti (2004)
the econometric model seeks to control for shocks to the relative demand of skilled labor. To this end, I
include in the regressions as controls several variables in order to absorb changes in the relative demand
for college graduates. I also use instrumental variables to further control for relative demand shocks. By
contrast, in this paper, I engage in a completely dierent exercise. I do not seek to hold constant demand
shocks. Instead, I am interested in establishing the role played by demand shocks in aecting changes in
college share across cities.
24the number of college graduates that may be driven by either demand or supply shocks.
The comparison of the two estimates is therefore informative on the relative importance of
demand and supply shocks.
To isolate relative demand shocks, I use as an instrument the weighted average of na-
tionwide relative employment growth by industry, with weights re
ecting the city-specic
employment share in those industries:
Change in Relative Demand in City c =
X
s
sc(EHs   ELs) (16)
where sc is the share of jobs in industry s in city c in 1980; EHs is the nationwide change
between 1980 and 2000 in the log of number of jobs for college graduates in industry s
(excluding city c); ELs is a similar change for high school graduates. If relative employment
of skilled workers in a given industry increases (decreases) nationally, cities where that
industry employs a signicant share of the labor force will experience a positive (negative)
relative shock to the labor demand of skilled workers (Katz and Murphy, 1992).
The rst stage relationship between demand shocks and changes in college share is shown
graphically in Figure 5. The gure shows that in cities that experience an increase in
the relative demand of college graduates the share of college graduates increases and the
relationship appears fairly tight. The regression coecient is .42(.02), with R2 of .44. This
means that at least 44% of the variation in changes in college share can be attributed to
observable demand shocks. (Of course, there are other demand shocks that are not captured
by the instrument.)
The instrumental variable estimate, in column 3 of Table 7, is .371 (.106) and is re-
markably close to the OLS estimate. The similarity between the OLS and the IV estimates
suggests that the increase in the college premium in a city caused by a demand shock (IV
estimate in column 3) is not very dierent from the empirical correlation between the college
share and the college premium that is observed in the data (OLS estimate in column 2).
In other words, most of the empirical correlation between the college share and the college
premium that is observed in the data seems to be driven by demand shocks.
7 Conclusions
Over the past 25 years, college graduates and high school graduates have experienced
dierent increases in the cost of housing and thus dierent increases in the overall cost of
living. The main contribution of this paper is to document that, as a consequence, the wage
dierence between college and high school graduates measured in real terms is signicantly
smaller than the wage dierence measured in nominal terms.
Specically, I show that much of the growth between 1980 and 2000 in the number of
college graduates has occurred in metropolitan areas that have a high initial cost of housing
and experience large increases in the cost of housing. I propose two skill-group specic cost
25of living indexes as an alternative to the nation-wide CPI that is typically used to de
ate
wages and incomes. My rst local cost of living index allows for dierential variation in the
cost of housing across metropolitan areas and skill groups. My second local cost of living
index also allows for variation in the cost of non-housing goods and services.
Using these two local CPI's, I nd that the level of the college premium is signicantly
lower in real terms than in nominal terms. For example, in 2000 the conditional dierence
between the wage of college graduates and of high school graduates is 60% in nominal terms
and only 37%-43% in real terms. Second, and most importantly, the increase in the college
premium between 1980 and 2000 in real terms is signicantly smaller than the increase in
nominal terms. Specically, the increase in nominal terms is 20 percentage points. The
increase in real terms is between 8 and 10 percentage points.
The implications of this empirical nding for disparities in well-being depend on the
reasons for the increase in the share of college graduates in expensive cities. I consider
two broad classes of explanations. Under a demand pull hypothesis, the relative demand
of college graduates increases in expensive cities because of localized skill-biased technical
change or other demand shocks. In this case, college graduates move to expensive cities
because the jobs for college graduates are increasingly located in those cities, and not because
they particularly like living in those cities. The increase in their utility level is smaller
than the increase in their nominal wage due to higher cost of living. Under a supply push
hypothesis, the relative supply of college graduates increases in expensive cities because
college graduates are increasingly attracted by amenities located in those cities. The increase
in the cost of living in those cities re
ects the attractiveness of the cities to skilled workers
and is the price for the consumption of desirable amenities. In this case, there may still
be a signicant increase in utility inequality even if the increase in real wage inequality is
limited. Of course, the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and it is possible that
cities experience both demand and supply shocks.
To determine whether relative demand or relative supply shocks are more important
empirically, I analyze the equilibrium relationship between changes in college premium and
changes in the share of college graduates across metropolitan areas. Consistent with demand
shocks playing an important role, I nd a positive association between changes in college
premium and changes in college share: cities that experience large increases in the fraction of
college graduates also experience large increases in the relative wage of college graduates. I
also present an instrumental variable estimate obtained by instrumenting changes in college
share with a measure of arguably exogenous relative demand shocks.
While I can not completely rule out that supply shocks may play a role, the weight of
the evidence seems consistent with the notion that a signicant part of the variation in the
relative fraction of college graduates across cities is driven by demand factors. If this is true,
the increase in well-being disparities between 1980 and 2000 is smaller than the increase in
nominal wage disparities and the problem of inequality is less severe than previously thought
This paper leaves open the question of what ultimately causes the local demand shocks.
26In my theoretical setting, I take these shocks as exogenous. Future research should focus on
exactly what generates the localized relative demand shifts that make college graduates more
productive in some parts of the country. Localized skill-biased technical change is a potential
explanation, as long as it is enriched by a theory of why demand shocks occur in some cities
and not in others. Beaudry, Doms and Lewis (2008) and Berry and Glaeser (2005) propose
realistic models and intriguing empirical evidence. Models with human capital spillovers or
agglomeration spillovers also have the potential to explain localized demand shifts (Moretti,
2004a and 2004b; Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti, 2007). Another potential explanation
centers on shifts in product demand across industries that have dierent skill intensities.
For example, industries like nance and high tech that are skill intensive and are located
in expensive coastal metropolitan areas, have been expanding during the 1980s and 1990s.
Future research should determine the generality of these industries' experience.
In interpreting the ndings of this paper, three points are worth highlighting. First,
consistent with the previous literature on inequality, the main focus this paper is on wage
dierences. However, the broader distributional consequences of the demand and supply
shocks depend not just on changes in relative wages, but also on who originally owns the
land in the cities that benet from the demand and supply shocks. A full empirical treatment
of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second, the return to college is but one measure of wage inequality. Although it has
received much attention in the literature on inequality, future research should determine
whether the results in this paper extend to other measures of inequality. Wage dierences
between blacks and whites should also be assessed using local cost of living de
ators, since it
is possible that dierences in geographical distribution expose blacks and whites to dierent
in
ation rates.
Finally, while my estimates are based on pre-tax earnings, accounting for federal taxation
is likely to make my results stronger. Since the tax system is progressive and is based on
nominal income, workers in expensive cities pay more in federal taxes than otherwise identical
workers in less expensive cities (Albouy, 2008). Furthermore, state taxes may accentuate
this eect, as expensive coastal states in New England and California tend to have more
progressive tax systems.
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31Appendix 1
In this appendix I change two assumptions of the model in Section 5. In Section 5, I
assume that the housing market for skilled workers is separated from the housing market
for unskilled workers in the same city. I also assume that labor supply in a city is innitely
elastic. Here I consider the case where the housing market is completely integrated|i.e.
skilled and unskilled workers in a city compete for the same set of houses|and labor supply
in a city is not innitely elastic but rather upward sloping.
Assume that the indirect utilities of skilled and unskilled workers in city c are, respec-
tively: UHic = wHc   rc + AHc + ic and ULic = wLc   rc + ALc + ic, where ic is i.i.d and
ic  U[ s;s]. This utility diers from Section 5 in two respects. First, the cost of housing
is now the same for skilled and unskilled workers living in city c: rc. This implies that skilled
and unskilled workers face the same housing market within a city, and that shocks to the
relative demand or supply of skilled workers will aect unskilled workers in the city through
housing costs. Second, the term ic allows for idiosyncratic preferences for a city. All the
other assumptions remain unchanged.
A skilled worker chooses to live in city b if wHb rb+AHb+ib > wHa ra+AHa+ia. A
similar expression holds for unskilled workers. If there are N unskilled workers and N skilled
















+ wLa   ra + rb (18)
where q = N=2s. Unlike Section 5, labor supply is upward sloping.
Demand Pull. Consider what happens when the productivity of skilled workers in-
creases relative to the productivity of unskilled workers in San Francisco, and nothing hap-
pens to the productivity of skilled and unskilled workers in Detroit. Some skilled workers
move from Detroit to San Francisco:
NHb2   NHb1 =
q(q(ka + kb) + 1)
h(2q(ka + kb) + 1)
 (19)
where I have added subscripts 1 and 2 to denote periods 1 and 2. Some unskilled workers
leave San Francisco for Detroit:
NLb2   NLb1 =  
q2(ka + kb)
h(2q(ka + kb) + 1)
 (20)
As in Section 5, both total population and the fraction of skilled workers in San Francisco
(Detroit) increase (decrease). As before, the nominal wage of skilled workers in San Francisco
increases
wHb2   wHb1 =

h
(21)The wage of unskilled workers in San Francisco and the wage of skilled and unskilled workers
in Detroit does not change. Rents in San Francisco increase by
rb2   rb1 =
kbq
h(1 + 2q(ka + kb))
 (22)
while rents in Detroit decline by
ra2   ra1 =  
kaq
h(1 + 2q(ka + kb))
 (23)
As in Section 5, it is possible to show that the dierence between the nominal wage of skilled
workers averaged across the two cities and the nominal wage of unskilled workers averaged
across the two cities increases. Furthermore, such an increase is larger than the increase in
the dierence between the real wage of skilled workers averaged across the two cities and the
real wage of unskilled workers averaged across the two cities.30
Supply Push. Consider now what happens when San Francisco becomes more desirable
for skilled workers relative to Detroit because the amenity that attracts skilled workers
increases there. The productivity of both skilled and unskilled workers, as well as the amenity
level in Detroit, do not change. The number of skilled workers who move from Detroit to
San Francisco is
NHb2   NHb1 =
q(q(ka + kb) + 2)
2q(ka + kb) + 1

0 (24)
The number of unskilled workers who leave San Francisco to Detroit is
NLb2   NLb1 =  
q(q(ka + kb)   1)
2q(ka + kb) + 1

0 (25)
The nominal wages of skilled and unskilled workers do not change. Rents in San Francisco
increase by
rb2   rb1 =
(q(4kb   2ka)   1)
2(1 + 2q(ka + kb))

0 (26)
while rents in Detroit decline by
ra2   ra1 =  
(q(4ka   2kb)   1)
2(1 + 2q(ka + kb))

0 (27)
As before, the dierence between the nominal wage of skilled and unskilled workers averaged
across the two cities increases more than the dierence between the real wage of skilled and
unskilled workers averaged across the two cities, if the elasticity of housing supply in San
Francisco is not much larger than the elasticity of housing supply in Detroit.
30As before, this is true if the elasticity of housing supply in San Francisco is not much larger than the
elasticity of housing supply in Detroit.Table 1: Metropolitan Areas with the Largest and Smallest Share of College Graduates in
the Workforce
College Change in Monthly Change in
Share in College Share Rent in Monthly Rent
2000 1980-2000 2000 1980-2000
Metropolitan Areas with the Largest College Share in 2000
Stamford, CT .58 .26 1109 759
San Jose, CA .48 .15 1231 892
Washington, DC/MD/VA .48 .08 834 532
Boston, MA-NH .45 .17 854 556
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo, CA .44 .12 1045 724
Ann Arbor, MI .43 .02 724 417
Columbia, MO .43 .06 485 239
Raleigh-Durham, NC .42 .12 669 427
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO .42 .10 693 419
Trenton, NJ .41 .14 776 494
Metropolitan Areas with the Smallest College Share in 2000
Ocala, FL .15 .02 514 285
Williamsport, PA .15 .04 434 229
Lima, OH .15 .05 444 226
Hickory-Morgantown, NC .15 .02 486 286
Johnstown, PA .14 .01 370 165
Flint, MI .14 .01 481 217
Vineland-Milville-Bridgetown, NJ .13 .01 617 368
Manseld, OH .13 .01 460 242
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA .13 .00 495 270
Danville, VA .12 .02 401 231
Notes: Share of college graduates is the share of full-time workers between 25 and 60 years
old with a college degree or more who live in the relevant city. Monthly rent refers to the




Fuels and Utilities 5.3
Other Housing 4.6
Transportation 17.2
Food and Beverages 14.9
Medical Care 6.2
Education and Communication 6.0
Recreation 5.5
Apparel 3.7
Other Goods and Services 3.5
Notes: Entries are the share of the main aggregate components of the CPI-U. For more
disaggregated categories see Appendix 4 in Chapter 17 of the Bureau of Labor Statistics's
\Handbook of Methods" (2007).Table 3: Changes in the Cost of Living, by Education Group
1980 1990 2000 Percent
Increase
1980-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ocial CPI
High-School 1 1.53 2.02 102%
College 1 1.53 2.02 102%
Percent Dierence 0 0 0
Monthly Rent
High-School 249 418 532 113%
College 298 570 761 156%
Percent Dierence 19% 36% 44%
Local CPI 1
High-School 0.97 1.45 1.86 91%
College 1.04 1.65 2.19 111%
Percent Dierence 7% 14% 18%
Local CPI 2
High-School 0.96 1.49 1.91 98%
College 1.07 1.83 2.42 127%
Percent Dierence 11% 23% 27%
Notes: Monthly rent refers to the rent paid for a two or three bedroom apartment. CPI 1
allows for local variation only in the cost of housing. CPI 2 allows for local variation both
in the cost of housing and the cost of non-housing goods and services.Table 4: Nominal and Real Conditional Wage Dierence Between Workers with a High School Degree and Workers With College or
More, by Year
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000 1980 1990 2000 1980-2000
Increase Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Model 1
Nominal Wage Dierence .40 .53 .60 .20 .35 .47 .53 .18
(.011) (.012) (.013) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Model 2
Real Wage Dierence - Local CPI 1 .33 .41 .43 .10 .32 .39 .42 .10
(.006) (.005) (.004) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Percent of Nominal Accounted for 15% 23% 27% 50% 9% 17% 17% 44%
by Cost of Living
Model 3
Real Wage Dierence - Local CPI 2 .29 .34 .37 .08 .29 .34 .37 .08
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.001) (.002) (.003)
Percent of Nominal Accounted for 27% 36% 39% 60% 11% 27% 30% 55%
by Cost of Living
MSA Fixed Eects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. The dependent variable in Model 1 is the log of nominal hourly
wage. The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of real hourly wage, where real hourly wage is the ratio of nominal wage and Local
CPI 1. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the log of real hourly wage, where real hourly wage is the ratio of nominal wage and Local
CPI 2. All models include dummies for gender and race, a cubic in potential experience, and year eects. Models in columns 5 to 8
also include MSA xed eects. Sample size is 5,024,221.Table 5: Nominal and Real Conditional Wage Dierence Controlling for Quality of Housing,
by Year - American Housing Survey
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000
Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nominal Wage Dierence .36 .48 .55 .19
(.024) (.008) (.011)
Real Wage Dierence - Not Controlling for Quality
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .29 .39 .43 .14
(.010) (.008) (.013)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .25 .33 .38 .13
(.010) (.008) (.012)
Real Wage Dierence - Controlling For Quality
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .30 .37 .39 .09
(.016) (.011) (.014)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .27 .32 .33 .06
(.03) (.015) (.019)
Notes: Standard errors clustered by metropolitan area in parentheses. Data are from the
American Housing Survey. Available housing quality variables include square footage, num-
ber of rooms, number of bathrooms, indicators for the presence of a garage, a usable replace,
a washer, a dryer, a dishwasher, outside water leaks, inside water leaks, open cracks in walls,
open cracks in ceilings, broken windows, rodents, and a broken toilet in the last 3 months.
The dependent variable is log of yearly earnings. Sample size is 237,210.Table 6: Robustness
1980 1990 2000 1980-2000
Increase
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1: Housing Cost by MSA, Skill, Race, N. of Children
Nominal Wage Dierence .39 .53 .59 .20
(.008) (.012) (.013)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .33 .41 .44 .11
(.006) (.005) (.004)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .29 .34 .38 .09
(.006) (.006) (.005)
Model 2: ACCRA Non-Housing Prices
Nominal Wage Dierence .40 .53 .60 .20
(.015) (.009) (.010)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .33 .41 .43 .10
(.006) (.005) (.004)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .24 .27 .29 .05
(.005) (.008) (.009)
Model 3: Commuting Time
Nominal Wage Dierence .40 .54 .60 .20
(.011) (.011) (.013)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .33 .41 .44 .11
(.006) (.004) (.004)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .31 .37 .40 .09
(.006) (.005) (.004)
Model 4: Include Immigrants
Nominal Wage Dierence .40 .54 .61 .21
(.011) (.012) (.013)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .34 .41 .45 .11
(.007) (.006) (.005)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .30 .34 .38 .08
(.006) (.006) (.005)
Model 5: Only Urban Workers
Nominal Wage Dierence .40 .52 .59 .19
(.011) (.008) (.010)
Real Wage - Local CPI 1 .33 .41 .44 .11
(.007) (.005) (.004)
Real Wage - Local CPI 2 .29 .35 .38 .09





College Share .375 .388 .371
(.031) (.070) (.106)
R2 .30 .10
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in column 1 is the city-
specic college premium, dened as the city-specic dierence in the log of hourly wage
for college graduates and high school graduates conditional on gender, a cubic in potential
experience, race and year. The dependent variable in columns 2 and 3 is the change in the
city-specic college premium. Entries are the coecient on college share in column 1 and
change in college share in columns 2 and 3. All models are weighted by city size.Figure 1: How Changes in the Share of College Graduates Relate to the Initial Share of




























































































































Change in Average Rent 1980−2000





Notes: Average rent is the average monthly rental price of a two or three bedroom apartment.Figure 2: How Changes in the Share of College Graduates Relates to the Cost of Housing















































1 Lowest Rent 2 3 Median Rent 4 5 Highest Rent















































1 Smallest Increase 2 3 Median Increase 4 5 Largest Increase















































1 Lowest Rent 2 3 Median Rent 4 5 Highest Rent















































1 Smallest Increase 2 3 Median Increase 4 5 Largest Increase
By Quintile of Predicted 1980−2000 Increase in Rent
Notes: The top panels show the 1980-2000 increase in the share of college graduates, by
quintile of the 1980 cost of housing (left panel) and by quintile of the 1980-2000 increase
in the cost of housing (right panel). Cost of housing is measured as the average monthly
rent paid by college graduates for a 2 or 3 bedroom apartment in the relevant city. The
bottom panels show the 1980-2000 increase in the share of college graduates, by quintile
of the predicted 1980 cost of housing (left panel) and by quintile of predicted 1980-2000
increase in cost of housing (right panel). The predicted cost of housing is the tted value
from a regression of rental cost on identiers for metropolitan area, education group, number
of children, race and interactions. This regression is estimated on the sample of renters of 2









Nominal Real − CPI 1
Real − CPI 2
Notes: The gure plots the conditional dierence between the average earnings of college
graduates and the average earnings of high school graduates measured in nominal and real
terms. The height of the bars is equal to the regression coecients from models in Table 4
(columns 1 to 3). CPI 1 allows for local variation only in the cost of housing. CPI 2 allows


























College Share in 2000
        










































Change in College Share 1980−2000
        




Notes: The top panel plots estimates of the city-specic college premium in 2000 against the
share of college graduates in 2000. The bottom panel plots the 1980-2000 change in college




































Shock to Relative Demand for College Grads − 1980−2000







Notes: The panel plots changes in the share of college graduates 1980-2000 on the y-axis
against 1980-2000 shocks to the relative demand of college graduates due to 1980 dierences
in industry mix on the x-axis. Shocks to the relative demand are dened in equation 16.